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PREFACE

The purpose

or

t.bil paper is to (1) review t.he concept ot privileged

cOll:llllll1ication (2) review the deve10pn9nt

or

the rule

ot privileged

communication (3) present an application ot tbe rule of privileged cOlmlunieation t.o the guidance counselor for the first time baaed upon the Wigmore Rules

2£. Evidence.

the W1p1Ore appE'OAcb 18 well accepted in legal cirolel.

S1n.oe

no test cue 18 available on t.he quest.ion of Whether or not. a guidance counselor is ent.itled to Pl"ivileged communication, the pm-pose bere il to determine

whether or not. the guidance counselor baa a lepl beau tor a claim to that
privilege. .Also it 18 hoped that it. wtll be clearly brought. out that in the
absence

or

a statute a counselor has no claim to the privilege. Moreover ,

this study' 111 lim1ted only to the scope ot priv1.leaed conrnu.n1catlona and

therefore, will not dlsouu the aspects ot po.sible 8\11ts tor malpractice or
suits tor libel and. slander.

iii
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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION
The word, "cOU11.8EJlor lt with tI1IUl7 connotations bas been applied

to

la~rs,

clergymen, adT1aors and basically to any 1nd1Y1du.a.l whose primary concern bas

been the a1ding ot man tormented by problema.

Stem1ng trOlll this develoJDent,

the fulfillment or this concept haa been actualized in educational ciroles

into a position termed the guidance oounselor. During the twentieth century
the pidance oounaelor hU beoome V8'l7 firmly implanted in our school system .. l

The guidance counselor by the V'f!Jr7 nature ot his role gathers data highly

personal in cbaracterand C01I111lUnicated in a counseling relationship with the
student in a very personal and intimate manner. 2

Howeftr, the legal role ot the guidance counaelor has never clearly been
defined espeCially in the realm ot priYilege conmmicat1on •.3 Therefore, the
object or tbia paper nil seek to present the oomplete hiStory and development

ot professional i.mmu.nity
The purpose

or

as it relates to gI1idance counseling.

'this paper vill to be re-evaluate the role

ot the guidance

lArthur J. Jones aDd Leonard N. Miller, "The National Picture ot Pupil
Personnel and Guidance Services in 195.3," The Bulletin or the National
Association 2! Secondarl School Princip!la;-IxX'O'f!! {F8oru.ary, 1954),-1.35.

2Tbomaa 11. Carter, "Protessional Immunity for Guidance CO'W'lIItelor,·
Personnel and Guidanoe Journal, XXXIII (November, 1954), 15.

-

.

-

3Ibld.
1

2

counselor in relationship to professional tmmunity by presenting a complete
history and development ot professional immunity.

From this review this paper

will endeavor to investigate what implications on professional immunity can be
related to counseling.

Profe.sor Carter b.u succinctly defiD8d the problem

ImmunitY' in a legal sense, means a form or condition of exemption.
Black detines it as 'an exemption trom pertorming duties which the law
genaral17 requires other oitizena to perform.' Hence a person, under
certain prescribed conditions, may be immune £rom arrest or prosecution.
Imtmmity is not an exemption or privilege merely to be enjoyed, it is a
condition which by necessity accompanies certain official acts.
"Privileged communications" are detined by Black as being 'in the
law of evidence any communications made to a counselor, solicit.or or
attorney, in protessional confidence, and which he i. not permitted to
di wlge' J otherwiae called a "confidential cOlIII'Nllication."
Modern statutory practice baa extended the right ot immuftity in
regard to prirtleged cOl'mlUllicatioDB to oertain profeSSiOns, such as
tbeolol7 and medicine, whose prutitioners are habitual17 and inevitably
the reoipients of' oonfidential oommunications.4
With this rmtahell view of' the problem we shall commence our study'.
The protessional immlmitY' of' which we speak is probably more aptlY' termed,

privilepd CGIIIlmlnicatlon.

The term priTileged oCl1lmW1ication has two meanings

within the scope of the law. 5 In one sense it refers to oral or printed
utterances which although defamatory are not actionable under the law.
this area the emphasis is upon libel and slander.
"privileged communication" reters to

communi~ation

In

In the other sense,
.Ade in a confidential

-

4Ibid.
'Francis J. Ludes and Harold J. Gilbert, eds., Corpus Juris Secundum,
EVII (New York, 1957), p. 954.

3
relationship, that is recognized by law and not competent to be produced in
court during the trial of a cue. 6 The rule of privileged communication has
been Bought by many groups, but the la.w has been very slow to extend coverage.
Common la.w has extended the prinlege of privileged communication only to the

attorney-olient relationship.

The development

ot statutory law bas extended

this privilege to other individuals and the relationships established therein.

Thus, we rind a privileged communication relationship existing between husband
7
and wif., physician and patient8 priest and penltent 9 and under certain set
relations.

10

With these preliminary thoughts in mind a nutshell view ot the .;n-oblem,
a pneral definition, and the breath

ot the term's application, we shall turn

our attention to the hutorical development ot privileged communication.

Only

atter we have firmly grasped the historical Significance ot the term will be
able to tully envision its development and its application to the guidance
counselor.

7corpus Juris Secundum,
8~., p. 82).
9~., p. 746.

-

lOIbid., p. 742.

OPe

cit., p. 654.

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL IMMUNITY
The history

ot the privilege dates

back lIlerely tour hundred years to the

reign ot Elizabeth I.ll Prior to that time an individual COIlld not be compelle

to testU'yJ thus, be could chose to testify or not to testify baaed upon bow
be telt. 12

However, in 1562 by Act ot Elizabeth I a pr;oovision vas established

"tor the eervices of proce8s out of a.ny court of record requiring the person
served to appear and to testity concerning any cause on the matter pending in
the court under penalty of ten pounds beside8 damage8 to be recovered by the
partyaggrieved • .,l) The reason for this de~ in development appears to reside
in the tact that there was little need for such an act up to this ti1'll8.

It

appeared at its conception to be a very natural exception to the then novel
right ot testimonial compulaion. 14 The new act was hued upon the fundamental
principle or government that the administration of justice is a mutual benefit

p.

llJohn Henry Wigmore, Evidence In Trials at Common Law, VIII (Boston, 1961
•

~4)
~

12clinton De Witt, Privi1epd Communications between Physician and Patient,
(Springtield, 1951), p. Ii.
-

-

13Ibid.
l4wigmore. 2£.

!:!!..

p. 543.

4

to all members of a cotmnUnit,. and every competent citizen is under an obligation to turther it as tbe matter of public dut,.; that the personal sacrifice is
a part of the necessary contribution tor the welfare ot the public .15 Arter
the enactment, the courts were confronted with witnesses who refused to answer

questions or testify on the grounds that their testimoll7 would breach a
committroent ot confidential communication which the,. bad made based either on
their personal honor or on public poliey.

Thus, the theory ot exoluaion in

those daya differs trom modern time in that the consideration was an objective

rather than a au.bjective one, atemming trom the oath ot honor ot the attorney
rather than from. the apprehension ot the cU.eat.

16 The courts were then faced

with the problem which still races us todq, namely whether or not justice 18
truly served by extending the rule

ot privileged communioations. However, as

the centuries have passed, the law both in Or'eat Britain and in .A.meric&1'1

jurisprudence has both ironically extended the privilege of non-disolosure in

favor ot particular persons and at the s.e time bas limited the scope and
application ot the original privilege.17 Broadly speaking the matters affected
by the doctrine of privilege ruay be clualfiad as political, judicial, aooial

and prote_ional.

'!'he more widely known ot these privileges are those whioh

relate to state secrets, political votes, trade secrets, religious beliets,

inter-marital tacts and self-incriminating mattera.

16

----s.

15alair v. U.
~

Wigmore,

(1918) 250

22. :!:.,

pp.

u.s. 273,281J
--

In terms ot' personal

-----

63L.Ed. 979J 395.01;. 461.

.............

170-74, 113-14, 521.

17,!!! ::! !!l.! (1951) 155 !!2:2.~. 345. 98 !,!2d 798.

6
relations the privilege bas been extended to husband wife, grand juries, petit
juror, judge, arbitrators, public offices and government informers who furnish
the govarment with eTidence of crime and that which 18 granted to an attorney

acting in a profes,1onal capacity.l8

In some state. the privilege baa been

extended into other personal relationships &uch

&8

pbTaician-patient relation-

sb1pa.19
Of' all of these relatiollllhlpa existing under the lav, the attorney-olient

surely merits tb1. exsmption trom the laVe

"'l'be first duty

ot an attorney,"

it baa been said, "is to keep the secreta ot the client.,,2O In the beginning,
the baais for the exemption rested in the honor ot the attorney, and it vas not
until the 1100's that the concept vas ."itched so as to pt"otect the client and
not the attorney.
Tbua, the oldest ot the priTileps ot communications appears to be

Ul'lqUestloned u tar back as the reign ot Elizabeth I.21 The privilege was
recopized b7 Roman law although baaed upon a different. setting than that ot
22
the common law.
In eS8ence, the privilege, &8 developed trom the courts ot
common law, is that no attorney 18 permitted whether during or after the
termination of his emplo1Jll&nt as woh, unles8 with hia client' II consent, to

18
COlJ?2:! Juria Secundum, 2E.~.' pp. 782-822.

-

19Ibid.
2Or!llor !. Blacklow (18)6) 132 §!!i.. ~. 401, 406.
21Berd v. lovelace (1517) 21 §!!I. RaR. 33; Dennis v. Codri~n (1580) 21

E~.~~~

-

22Max Radin, "'l'he Privilege of Confidential CoD'llWlicatlons Between Lawyer
and Client," XVI (CalU'ornla !!! Review (September, 1928), 487.

7
te.tit,. as a wit..a. and dilcloae aD.7 oommu.ni.catlon, oral or documentary,
made to bim as such attorneT by or on behalf

ot client in tbe

course and tor

tbe purpose ot his employment, whether in reference to &nT matter as to whicb
a diepute baa arisen or otherwise, or to disclose

s.ny'

advice given by him to

bia oll8nt, provided hoveftr, that 8DT such oollll11Wl1cation is not made or advice

given in furtherance ot &nT criminal or fraudulent purpose.

The privilege

applies not only to the attorney, but also to h18 eeoretary or clerical
assistant.

Furthermore, the client h1maelf cannot be compelled to disclose

an)"

cCllm\Ul1cation between himael!, and hi. attorne)", which hil attorne,. would not
disclose without his consent.

23

HoV8ftr, it should be noted that nothing

pre'ftlnta the client from 'VOluntarily giving forth confidential 1nf'ormation, it
he so desires.
III

~

!. Lovelace

upon the cue. 24

the solicitor

In Dennis

wu exempted from examination touching

!. Codr~n the court

indicated on a motion to

exam:1ne one OldnortbJ

touching a matter in variance, wherein he bath been of
counsel, it is ordered he shall not be oompelled by subpoena
or otherviae to be examined upon arrr matter concerning the
same, wherein be the said Mr. Oldsvorth vas of oounsel either
bT the indU'terence choice of both ~~ie. or with either of
them by' re8.8on ot &ny' annuit;r of fee.25

In IelW!l

!. KelW!l, the soU.oitor wu permitted to

23w.tamore, 21!. ill.,

p.

542.

24Berd !. Lovelace (1577) 21

2Sneun1s !. CodriDatO~

!!!I..

Rep. 33.

(1580) 21 ~. Rep. 53.

be questioned only upon

8
those matters whiah in no way touched upon his role or protession as a solicitor. 26

rue

same idea is confirmed in Onbie' s Case in which the courts

stated "a lawyer who was of counsel may be examined upon oath as to the matter
of agreement, not to the validity or an as5llrance, or to matter of coones 1. 21
Still upholding this concept in waldron !.
la~r

is

~t

~

the court declared that the

bound to make answer tor things which may disclose the secrets

ot his client's c&se ... 28 More explicitly in Sparke !. Middleton, they declared
that the lawyer could testify only to "such things as he either knew betore he

. . ot oounael or that came to his knowledge since bT other persons. 29
From this development with some exception it is conceded that the purpose

ot the privilege i. to encourage the employment or prote.sional advisers bT an
indlyidual in need ot such services and to promote abeolute freedom ot
cou.ultation bT removing all rear on the part of the client that his attorney

may be compelled to dilclose in court the communications or the acquired
information in the course ot his profel.ioul emploJ'Mnt. 30 'ftlis is an
important tact which we shall examine later as .. make applications to the role

2~el1f!l !* Kel"'&l (1,80) 21
270nbie
28

E!!!

(1642)

!!I. !!E..
82 !!I. RaE. 422.

47.

Waldron !. ~ (16,4) 82 Eng. Rep. 853.

29sparke !. Middleton (1664) 83 ~. ReE. 1019.
30Altbough generall)r accepted one need not look too far to find objections
It is not 11kal7 that the privilege will be abolished. Legal periodical
literature has ~ such examples.

9

ot the guidaDce counselor. The essential element

here 1s that the courts have

recognized the needs of • client to haw Mcreoy 80 that the olient can best

crup

and work through hi. cue in court.

We ahall reserw implioations aDd

Warenoes upon this tact tor later consideration.
AltlxNlb almost

UD1wraal1~'

approved by' both beach and bar th:l.a privilege

baa not escaped critioism and the ..ath
perhaps the first to denounce 1t)1

ot

~.

In England Jeremy Bentham was

In America, Chiet Justioe Appleton, at the

SUpreme Court ot Masaachueetta, wu equal17 ,"bement in

deDouncinl the

priv11ep.
'I'he rule at law by which the o0l'1t1dent1al cOlllllU.llioations
the cl1Emt to bi. attorney ,. olott. Caiq] in:v101able

ot

and oompu.leory ..ereoT, 18 diahonorable and dell"acl1ni to
the legal prot.aion--1njurioua to the public, and
entire17 Ul1Deceaaary to the client tor &D7 pr'oper end

legtt1mat.e purpose. Were the rule aboll8hed, the relation
betwen the client aDd the attor_YJ vbereftr it ex1ated,
would be conterred within the 'bouDda ot integr1tT and
enlightened publio poliq, .. it should be.32
Howftr, the ooarta realized that the privilege . . an obetacle in the
oexaplete disoovery ot truth.

Thua, the doctrine UD.der1rent a change in the

1700's. '1'b8 court. were faced on the

ODe

lide with the pri'rilege as an

obataole to the d1acoftl7 ot 1a"utb and on the other baud with a new tbe0I7
whiob required an ampl1t1cat10D at the privilege.

"The new theory looked to

t

neces.ity ot providing subjectively for the ol1ent freedom of apprehension in

consulting his legal adv1sor ••33 The new ooncept. existed side by side for

3lJeretn7 Bentham,

!!!!. L1m1ta 2! Jur1af!j1d!nce,

32ne Witt, ~. ~., p. 8.

3Jwipore, ~. ~., p. 543.

(New York, 1951), passim.

10

nea.rlT a half' a century and then a !'uller development. ot the new concept
began.34 One ot the ironic factor8 of this development i8 that details of the
privilege were still in their tormative Stage8, in the 1800's. Actually, the
t'WO struggled side by aide ao dUterently and "at merging into one.
no rule ot evidence bad so

~unsettled

Perhaps,

pointa until the middle ot the

6ighteenth century •.35
It ill perhaps best at this point to au.1ft up the nature ot the development
or this ru.le ot evidence.

First, the privilege did not eX&1'l1pt the client, tor

the point ot honor stemmed not trom him but from the attorney •.36 Tb1s concept
bad little practical value except in ans_ring a bill

ot discovery, tor all

durina that period the party was privileged in common law courts trom testUying in the trial ot civil eases.

However, as the newer tbeOl"y began to develop

the client began to be exempt frcxn making discovery ot c011lO.\Ulieations re latina

to the very case at the bar. Bowver J with the pressure ot the older tMOl"Y,
it still had to be insisted trom the bar that "the privilege is that ot the
client and not ot the attorney.·.37
The early decision

ot Justice Buller in 1772 p&8aed unheeded. He pro-

claimed that "it is the privilege ot the cli3nt and not ot the counselor the

.35~.,

p.

544.

-

36Ibid.
37cre!'!OUlh !. Oaakee (1833) 39

!!!I..

Rep. 68.

11
attorney_,,38

Thus, when in 1801, Lord Eldon declares "the privilege of the

client and the publiC, tf the new theory begins to bear tru.it. 39
UDder the older theory the attorney exemption was limited to communica-

tions received linee the begbming ot the litigation at the bar and tor its
pwopo.s

on17. But th1a v1ewpoint

was s 10w17 losinl diatavor.

Chier Baron

Borden in 1743 declared.
Wben the cue 14 ended, he u then only to be considered with
respect to his former employer &II one man to another and then the
breach ot trust does not tall within the jur1ediction ot the Cgurt,
tor the Court cannot determine what is torm, but what 18 law. 4
Under the newer theory the concept of the privilege wac first extended to
include commnicatioll8 during other litigation, th9n in term. ot contem.plat.ion
or litigation, then to a controveray not under litigation

am

then tinally to

consultation tor legal advice, with or without litigation in sight.

The

shackles of' the older theory were not thrown ott until the 1070's when the eaur
comented when a counsel cited the earlier ruling as precedents in Minet !.
MorfJ!!!'

RThe law hu nov attained to a rooting which made me a litt.le

surpr1aed to hear the matter n-opened • .,hl
One ot.btr point under the older theory was that the priv11ep could be

38W1gmore , !>R 39wrip t !.

m·,

J:!Ner

40Anae le;r !. ~

4~1Det !.

p.

54h.

(1801) 31

!.!!i. !!E..

2! A?J!lesea

1051_

(1793) 17 ~ ~.

Morl!!! (1873) 8 L.R. Ch 361, 366.

!!:.

1139, 1240.

12
waived by the attorneY' 1£ he so desired. The Oourt would not admonish the
attorney it he deoided to break the trust.

''TIle court oannot determine what i

honor,·42 said Chief' Baron Borden in 1743. Although it is sate to as.ume that
INCh action wu not UIU&l.l;y 1;alcen under the older t,heory, it retarded the

development ot the newr theory tor several decades.

Tb.us, the teeling arouse

in the 1700-. based on the rule. ot the 1;:00'. tbat a client should have and
doe. need complete

contidence in hi. lapl adv1aer in order for him to ..cure

the beat representation without appreheu10ns became implanted in the theory

the rule ot ev1denoe.

0

Tbua, Wigmore 8W111'1&rize. the theor)" betore he begins an

exbauetive anal7s1a of each component ot his INDfII&I"7 thusly.
wb.ere legal advioe ot 8D7 kind 1a 801lght trom a prote••ieul
legal adri.eer in his capacity as such the communication
relat1Dg to that pw."pOae made 1n oontldence by a cU.ent, is
at his iDstance permanently proteoted tor diaclosure by
h1m8elt or by the legal adv1aer except the protection 'be
1iI&ived.43

With this rather tmCOinct and apt

~

ot the application of the

prlv1lep to the attorney-clieDt relationship, we shall now trace the develop-

ment ot the privilege u it pertains to the !>bya1oian-patient relationship. ir/i
wll note bow the application dUfer..

This is important in determining the

role of the gu1dance oounselor and hi. 1ftI!1unity.
Probably contrary to popular concept1on confidential cOl'lJmU.n1catlon betwee

pbyaio1an and patient i8 not privileged under CGmZlk>n law.44 Privilege

42AD8eley !_ ~

43tiigroore,

2! Anglesea, supra.

2E. :!!.,

--- ---

p.

554.

-

-----

44r-1utual Life Insurance Co. v. OWen (191»
...........

......

----

III Ark. 558 •

13
col'llf!l.Ull1catlon bas been establ18bed by the rule

ot c1vil

law in some jurisdio-

tiona. 45 Outside the courtroom, the physioian is l.tt to the dictates ot hi.
consoience I his protessional ethics and &n1' other f'oroe. whioh might bear upon
him on the question

ot whether or not

he should disclose certain intonnatlon

eommurdcated to him by his patient. However, when called to testify in court,
the

p~ician

could not retuee to te.tUy nor could the patient objeot to the

ot wbateyer eff'ect the testimol\T would have upon
the richta, reputation or feelings of' either the pat.ient or the pb)rBician.46

pb,ys1ciarl·. testimol\T in sp1te

The

underl¥1nl principle was

that the disclosure

ot the whole truth vas

es..nt.1al. to the proper adrUnistratlon ot justice and that the need tor it tar
outweighed arq consideration of' protes8ioMl confidence.47 AlthouCh, the
Court. of' England u .. have seen have dneloped this privilege and have
aaaidioua1.7 applied it to the attorney-client relationab.1p, the courta have
ref'uaed to extend the prinle. to the members ot the medical protession.

The

extension in America haft been _de by statutory law. 48 nlinois baa no

prinl.. tor pbTs1cians.49

4'For one such an example see Wen's Louis1lM. Statutes Anaotated, Section
15: 477 (19S1)

46aol le !. Northwestern National. ReUet Association (1897) 10 !.!!. 35.
47ne

Witt.

22- !,!:!.,

p. 6.

-

48Ibid., p. 13.
49Jaclalon !. Pills'!<!!7

(1878) 1t4 !-!. ed 537, )80

n1. 554.

The first epoch-marking case of the common law concerning this privilege

occurred in 1116 in the trial of the Duchess or Kingston. The Duchess was
triad before the House of wrds on a oharge of bigamy. Mr. CeAr Hawldnes, an
eminent surgeon, who had attended the Duohess, her husband the the child, had

been summoned to court. v!b8n asked whether the accused had. admitted the first
marriage the witness replied;

ttl do not know how tar anything that baa come

before me in a confidential trust in my protelsion, should be discloeed
0
consistent with m:y professional honor .,,5
The Earl of Mansfield in his otfice

as Lord High stewart at the trial, ruled that the question mwst be answered and
further OOVIllentad:

I suppose Mr. Hawldns roean.s to deTlllr to the question upon the
grOWld that it came to his knoWledge some way from his being
employed as a surgeon for one or both parties.
It all your lordships will acquiesce, Mr. Hawkins will understand that it is your ju.dgment and opinion that a surgeon has no
privilege, whether it i8 a material question, in civil or a
criminal cue to know whether the parties were married, or whether
a cbild was born, to sq that his introduction to the parties was
in the coure'3 of his profession, and in that way be came to the
lmowl.edge of it. I take it for p"tmted, t.hat it Mr. HawI.dns understands that it is a satisfaction to him, and a clear justification to
all the world. It a eurgeon va. voluntarily to reftal these Moreta
to be saved, he would be guilty of a breach ot honor and of a great
inducretion; but t.o give that. information to a court of justice
which by the law of the land be is bound t.o do, will never be
imputed to him a. any indisoretion whatever.51

Thua, the words of Lord }1ansf1eld formulate the ba.sis for continued
c0:nmon law rules.

However, several points lIl'I1st be noted in this cue. First,

50DucMas ~ KlAg.ton

5lIbid •

-

!!:!!1

---

(1776) 20 How St .. Tr.,

355.
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it was the surgeon, Dr. Hawkine, who objected to giving testimony, not the
Duchess.

Secondly, the question asked related to the fact ot a. previ.oWl

marriage and in no way to a medical concern discowrab1y by observation or
examination, or to 8lJ¥ communication by' the patient with reference to her
condition ot health.

'l'he question itself' vas indeed without the scope

ot

medicine. 52 However, the courts haw con.at.rued and applied the Manstield
decision to compel the pbyB1c1an to duclose all relevant tacta ot which be hu
knowledge whether such facts concern the pl'q'sical imperfections ot the patient,
his healtb, or otberwJ.ee .53
BowYer, t.h8 common rule remains in force in England despite the efforts
in recent years by the presaure groups ot the medical protassion to enact a

Chqe.54
1'be nrst privilege on non-disolosure

ot the physician patient relation-

ship in Anglo-American oirolee . . areated by the legislature ot the State ot
New York in 1828.55 'Whatever prompted the laVlJl8.kers to enact the statute is
not olear.

However, it bas been oontended that the revisers were influenced by

56

a comment ot Mr. Justice Buller in \'/1180n !. Ruta1t.

It appears that there

was a compelling pressure to gi,", the medical profession the same cloak ot

immunity which had been given to the legal. protession.

52w1lson !. Raskall (1792) 4

5.3aarner !. Ga.rner .36
54DeW1tt,

13.

!!!:!_

~. ~.

The original statute,

753, 760.

Rep. 196.

2E. ill., p. 12.

--_

55New York Revised
..................... Statutes (1820) n 406, Part II e. VII Art. 8 paragraph
56wilson !. Rastall supra.
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wh1ch has served as the bas:Lc pattern ot other states and ot.her cotmtr1es,

proT1dea that t
No person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery sball
be allowed to disclose any intormat.ion whioh he may have acquired in

attending &aT patient, in a professional character, and which
1ntormation was necessary to enable him to prescribe tt:"I" such pat.ient
u a piv'aician, or to do atV' act tor him as a surpon.;:'7
During the oentury following its enactment a large number of states, and United

States poness1ons enacted s1milar statutes oontaining the test,1lnonial privi-

lege.

Unf'ortunately the lawmakers sacrificed clarity tor brevity

80

that

enauiDg years not.e that revisiOns had to be made 80 that the existing statutes

bear little reaemblance to the original.58
Tbtt basic priDCiplea

ot the statute are the s_, but they differ in their

wording, content, scope and lim1tat.ions. 59 The priv11ege is extended to
licensed physicians and in a tew cuee it has been extended to nurses and
60
co.ntident.1Al cler:i.cal assistants. In New York, the privilege baa been accorded

to dent.18ts. 61 The extent and scope of the jur1Bdiotion' s divergence can be
visuaU.zed in the fact that in

57New

!!!:!

80_

Rev18ed statutes,

jurisdictions it may be invoked in civil

22. ill,.

58Alabama , Arizona, Arkansu, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentuoky, LouiSiana, l-!ichigan, Minnesota, 11ississlppi,
l-H.esouri, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New MexiCO, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Sout.h Dakota, Utah, Uashi~ton, VJest
Virginia, Wisconsin, 1Y'yoming.

59ne

Witt,

6olbid •

-

61Ibid •

-

!!E. ~.,

p. 17.
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actions, in some areas in both oivil and cr:1.mina.l litigation; whereas in
louisiana, it oan be cl.ailMd only in criJninal action. 62 In moat cues the

prohibition of disclosure applies only to information which was necessary to
enable the physician to presoribe tor or treat the patient.
the law exctud9S

any'

In a tew states

evidence obtained while treating the patient whether it

be obtained in cOnjunction with the treatment

ot the patient or not. 63 In

Kansas, the statute prohibits a physioian trom disclosing

an)"

information

relating to t.he patient's condition, injury, or the tUne, manner, or
circwnatance under which the ailment wu incurred. 64 In Pennsylvania"Wormation" is not protected "only communication" made by tbe patient to the
physician ''which shall tend to blacken the character ot the pat.ient" are within
the scope of the stat.ute. 6$ The privilege in New Mexico, is limited "to any
real or wpposed veneral or loathsome disease, except in cues involving t.he
66
Worknum's Compensation Law where the soope of the privilege ia enlarged.
In
Kentucky, the privilege is limited to cases whioh have to do with the subject
of Vit&l Statist.ics. 67
The early statutes made no provision tor the waiver of the privilege.

ever, the new statutes grant the right ot waiver by t.he person, his

62Ibid •

-

6)~.

64Ibid.

66 Ibid •
-

6'Ibid.

67Ibid.

How
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representat.ive or act.ing in his place.

However, there is a tendency in some

statutes to withhold the privilege in those cases where t.he patient or his

representat.ive has voluntarily placed the issue ot the patient's condition ot
health in the ease.

In certain areas, such as abortion or illegitimacy, the

physician may be oompelled to teatif."y.68

These examples should suffice to show

the divergence ot meaning and application ot the privilege.

It theretore

behooves an individual to tully examine and understand the law as it applies

to hie particular situation in his particular legal jurisdict.ion.
ODe tinal point wb1ch needs clarification is that we have not been concerning ourselves with a question of medical or prole.ional ethics outside the

courtroom. The statute places ita soope only within the confines ot the court-

room.

~'hatever

the physician wishes to com.mu.ni.cat.e outside the courtroom is

beyond the statute's limitations.

The physician is only bound by bis medical

and protes.ional ethics, and bis conscience.

It is generally agreed that such

a disclcaars would be a violation of his medical and professional propriety.
It a pb1aician would indisoreetly disclose such information at a confidential

nature, be would not violate the stat.ut.e .. bOlfever reprebensible his conduct
might be. 69 The statute only grant.s the right to seal the lips ot the

ph;ysician in t.he courtroom, i t t.he pat.ient so desires.

But, the statute does

not. limit t.he physician tram communicat.ing this idea to a.ny Tom, Dick, or Harry

trom Ooast to Coast.

68 Ibid •

-

Although to some degree w bave discussed the cWveloJRlnt of professional
bmun1~

in the preceed1Dg cbapt.er. Wbat. we shall endeavor bere 18 to show

bow the pr1.v11ep generally operates and 18 generally applied 1n American
Thie d.eftlopment baa been reached and ia still continuing to

jv.toiJIp.ru.d&nce_

be defined as 11tlpt,ion ar1se••
The first factor under constderat1oD is that the principle that certain

relatione

&r.'"e

d1acloaure by

eontident:1.&l aDd certain commnn1catiol'l8 priv11epd apiut
III

witness its a rule of ev1dence public pollcy.

1'be rule as ..

know it. in American court. Jur~ 18 tOllftded upon atat1ltory law in O&IQ

other than at.t.ol"'l1l9Y'-cl1eftt..

. hen oertain confidential relati.oQs exist between

two in.d1Y1duala the law will not eo.1 or permit one ot the partiea to violate
the con.f'ldence by test:lt'y'1.Qg without the consent or the other party- 70

refera to the oormunicatioa which wu _de to t.t.

OM

n

in the oont1denee in wtd,ch the relation wu 1up:1.red_

mald.ni both parties competent

'!"bi.

part,. by the other party
~re,

a statute

and compellable to teatitjr oannot be conat.ru.ed

open 1:J:.ItJ door to a rull inquiry into auch privileged ~catlons. 72 Thu

70state !.

F1.znn

11,q_2. !. ~

251 ~"!,!. 2d 69, 73 J 363 ~. 106.

D.C .K.!.

84 !..

SUa:-

967

72Sa'!l!! !. Stanlel 1 S.2d 21, 24J 241!!!. 39.
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rule of evidence only' applies to that part of testimony which is deemed
privileged.

'fbus, a witness must testU'y to all that knowledge relating to

the case which does not come under the scope of privilege.

In the case!!

!!!.

Herrnstein, the court declared that the rule was conditional rather than
absolute.
It ought to follow that no limitation of such nature should be
recognized unless it is clearly demanded b,y some specific important
extr1naic policy and that every intendment should be made against
such demand.13
And yet clearly indicated--the statutory privileges

are absolute in the sense

that even in matters involving public justice, a court may not oompel disclosure of confidential communications thus privileged. 14

What 18 clearly accepted is that since privilege is a matter by statute,
then an absence of statutes means that no privilege exists .15 The questions
of whether or not the statute should be loosely or broadly construed depends
upon the authority making the interpretation. 76 The rule applies to all
testimony including bero..... trial examination and it extends only to the
communication. 77
The courts have generall,. upheld the historical concept of the newer
theory that the public has the right to know the full truth and u

such it

1J!! !:! Herrnstein 6 Q!!!2. ~. 260, 266.
7Ustiles !. Clifton Spr1ys Sanitarium ~., D.C.

-

'7SIbid.
76pa;rkhurat y. Citl

_

2! Cleveland 11 l!.

29.

17weu .................
T. Weia 72 -NE 2d 245; 141 .....---Ohio ........
St. 41.

My

74 !:. Supp. 407.
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otten handicaps justice, but the ultimate value of the privilege bas been
accepted despite this recognition. 78
The most important tact i8 that the privilege is only applicable to those
relations whioh are recognized under the law.

Thus, if' two individuals enter a

relationship which they consider conf'identlal, and it this relat.ionship is not
recognized under the law, then no priT1.1ege exiats and one or both parties must
testif)' to the nature of' the communication in that relationship. 79

!!'! !:! Alber.!

~lndl!2:

!!! Memoria}.

HoBP!tal indicated that any- fact which

was plainly observable to anyone could not be held to be privileged. 80 Follow-

ing this concept

!l!!! !.

Industrial Commission

2! Ohio

held that if' a third

party, not a member of the privileged relation, overhears by acoident or intent
and is not a neceaaa.:ry interlll8diary, such a person may testify as to the

oommunication, -being absolutely unaffected by the law of privilege.nal
The rule does not apply to attesting witnesses. 82 Moreover, the privilege

does not terminate with the cessation or the protected relationship, but

continue. thereafter. 83 Whether or not testimo~ shall be considered
privileged will depend upon the law or the state and in the case

ot t'ederal

78Connectiout Import 22,. !. Cont1.neJ-ial P:1~tilli!!l C~:E. D.C. Conn 1 FRD

190.

-

--

79Hutokiaa
v. Ernst 45 S.Ct.
423.
;;;;;.;.........~
....... 201, 235J 235 u.s. 684, 50 ....L.Ed.
-..
ao!!! !:! Albert IJ.ndley !!! Memorial Hospital C.A.NY. 209 !: 2d 122.

-

8l!l!:!! !. Industrial Commission
82Jaokson

2! ~

App 12 HE 2d 9,']7.

!. PiP'!J~ supr:a.

83Marti!l y_ ~ 1~6 P2d 681J 22 Was 2d 505.
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courts it will reside upon the law ot the state in which the case arose. 84
The rule 18 to be applied only to those relationships to which the privilege

applie., and is explicitly expressed in the statute. 8S
Co!J'A!!

Jur~~

Secundum bas aptly summarized the relationships which bave

been recognized under certain o1rCUflUStanoeS:

It baa been said to be universally coneeedad that the privileged
communications are those made by a person holding a certain
confidential relation in particular to that ot ph7sician and patient,
attorney and cUant, clergyman or priest and penitent, husband and
wite, government and informer, assignors in certain instance. and
parties wben the adverse parties are personal representatives ot
deceased persons or olaim or deferred as heirs, etc. The tendency
il not to extend the cluses to whicb. the pri'lfilege trom disclosure
is granted, bu.t to restrict that privilege. So a privileged
oommunioation statute afford8 proteotion only to those relationships
specif'ioalty named therein. The court mq not prescribe such
privilege in behalf ot any particular class and the legislature alone
mq do 80. The verT tact that testiJaouial privileges are bued on
speoifio oontidentia' relations is proot that they do not extend to
all sucb relations. Sf
Therefore, unle8s speCifically stated, we may not assume that a privileged
relationship exists.

Theretore, what an individual mal' teel 18 a confidential

relatioll8hip, is not a oontidential relationship unless recognized under the
law.

Thus, in Illinois there exiats

QO

recognition ot the J)h1'Bician-patient

relationshiP.87 Moreover J the conau.nications to a spiritual adviser have
privilege only 1£ accorded by statute.

The communication among other

- - -st. -Paul -v. r:ansas City -Lite Insurance Co.
- C.C.!

840.5. First Trust Co. of
Him 79-Fed

w. -

85We1a !.

!!!!! supra.

86corp!! ~uris Secundum, ~.

87Jackson !. Pillaburz aupra.

.2.ll.,

p. 141.
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stipulations must be made to the clergyman in his professional capacity and in

the course ot his ecclesiastical functions.

Horeowr the conmllnication to a

spiritual adviser must be made by a person seeking religious or spiritual
88
advice, aid or comfort.
'!'be oommunication must be penitential in character
and proper in order to enable the spiritual advisor to discharge the function

of his ottice. 59 Finally the communication II'I.lst have been made and received in
confidence .90
In the state of nli.nois only the attorney-cl1ent privilege 18 recognized.
In general, however, from the deoi.ion ot Jackson

!. Plllabuq', the rule as to

confidential communication such as those bet1l8el'l attorney and client, does not
apply to attesting 1f1tne••es. 9l Moreover, the common law rule that no
privilege

&8

to COl'IRUlicationa between pb1'81oian and patient ex1ats still

prevail.• eless chaQged by statute was specifically deolared in Cronin y. Court

--... .

ot Honor 1st Dutrict. 92

-.

From. this analysis of both the hutory, origin and deve lopnent, we are
able to

no~

that the priv1.1ege applies on.l.y' to the attorney-olient re1ationsh1'

uDier oommon law. Secondly, the privilege has been extended to other
confidential relations by statutory law.

88Johns~n

y.

In no place has the investigation

Cor~nwealth 221 ~J 2d 87.

-

89Ibid.
90Ibid.

-

91Jackso;n !. f!!l!bury supra.
92cronin

y. ~ 2f Honor !!! Dist.r~?:t: 187 III ~. 480.
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pointed out that the guidance counselor comes under the scope of privileged
conlIl1wl1cation and professiona.l immunity.

The courts seem to have been very

specUic that unless explicitedly stated one haa

00

basis upon which to aseume

that the privilege would be extended to the guidance counselor.

Moreover, at

the time ot the investigation there were no cases pending on this question.
Furthermore, U the rule of privilege were to be applied to guidance counselors
the guidance counselor would probably be accorded no more extension than that
1Ihich exists to other privileged relationships.

'l'he MOat important factor as

the history and the developnent of the privilege have

80

aptly pointed out i8

that the public i. more concerned with the discover,. of the truth than the
desire tor the privilege and that when the privilege 18 accepted, it is tor the
client's benefit.

Thus, a guidance counselor could never use the privilege to

protect himself' or to prevent his ooanents from being subject to suit.
counselor should be fully aware that the client i t he

80

desires, uaum.1ng a

privilege under the law to ex1at, the client may disclose any or all
communications made in a counseling relationship.

'1.'he

The relationship of the guidance counselor and tba law is our in1nediate

concern.

\\1hile the guidance counselor may find himself involved in

litigation tor malpractioe, a libel and slander suit, for testimony as an
expert witness, our concentration has been upon one aspect the counselor's
world, namely:

privileged oormmnication and the guidance counselor.

To date

there have been no cases or litigation betore the courts which might sbed
light upon what the nature of privileged communication and the guidance
counselor.
Moat individuals in counseling look to David W. Louisell, a law,er, whose
speciality concerns paychiatrists and psychologists' rights under the law.

His

articles directly concern pSl"bologists, but as McGowan and Schmidt state:
"its implications tor all protessional counselors are obvious. n93 Although the
most diract way would be to ex.am1ne guidance counselors and their role with the
law, it is beat to examine the Louisell approach so that we can eXUline what
inferences might appty to guidance counselor in his role ot a psychological

93John F. McGowan and Lyle D. Schmidt, Counaeli!!l' Readil!is!! Theon
Practice, (New York, 1962), p. 605.
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or, possessing a I-'h.D. in the rield or coun."eling, i::1 his role as a counseling
psychologist.
Perha!,s

OM

of the most concise and yot. com,prehen."ive reviews ot the

literatu..""O on this subject can be round in Volu."n.e I Nurrber 1 or the Counselor
Education

~P!"ruion.

Thi. Fall, 1961, issue looka at all the major articles

concerning the counselor in the legal world. 94 Fra.nk W. Miller and Richard J.
Simpson consider the areas of the cOWUIelor as an expert witne.s, the area ot

privileged ca.mnunication, and the area ot libel and slander. 95 Marq readers
are quick

to note the Iverson !. Boet case in which the parents ot a student.

who committed suicide atter term1natina counseling irJt.ervievs with a professor

ot education, were

8Ui.ng the professor on

the basi. that the professor should

haw notitied the parent. of the girl's condition. 96 For it the professor had

notified the parents of the girl'. condition, tbs parents contended, then the
parents could have taken prEtwnt:1:ve lISaauras and the girl would not have
committed suioide.

'!'be court ruled in favor

ot the professor indioating that

be was not responsible tor the girl's suicide and that be had no commitment to

notify' tbe girl' 6 p&1:"ents since he oould not pre-detem1ne her aotions.
However, most ot the artioles in this journal tollow the same line of

94lbld.

-

9~ank '\IT. Miller and Richard J. Simpson, -Some Legal Implications of the
Client-Counselor Relationship--A Review or the Literature, ft Oounselor Eduoatior.
$Upervialon I (Fall, 1961), 19-29.
. _.
96Iver80n !. BoSU!:' 10 Wia 2d, 129.
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ot thinking

&8

previously oited artioles in t.hat. t.hey do not reter d1reotly to

the gaJ.ds.nce cou.nselor.

In an article entitled, "A Suggested Privilege for

Confidential Communications with Marriage Counselor," the author in the
Pe!!!!llvan1a.

!!!! ReTiew

suggest that the aspect of the privilege ot confiden-

tial communioation should be extended to marriage oounselors. 97

The journal

alao auaesta 'l'homu M. Carter '8 article which we have mentioned in our paper

1n1t1al4r and which _ will subsequently mention. 98 Martha Cottle otters an
artiole with a most interesting title, "Wltnesaes--Priv11ege Comsmmication to
Psychotherapists. "99 At the onaet the reader receivea the 1111pression that this
might be a moat exhaust.ive article on t.he subject.

However, Mias Cottle

presents a briaf rel'JUIfle of the Taylor case and Bender. !. Ruvell.
whioh will be discussed later in the paper.

Both ot

John J. Cusock advocates in his

article, "Qualify Your Psychologists," the licensing and dat1n1ng ot the rola
loo
of the psyohologist in the legal world.
John L. McCary in, "The
Psychologist in CO'Ill'"t, It in the Chi?!C2

~ ~

Re".r!aw gives a brief' and

adequate presentation of the role ot the psychologist in oourt. 10l Fina1~,

97Anonymous. "A Suggested Privilege for Confidential Communications with
Marriage Couuelors, If University of P!!'!'!llvania Law Rev1ew cn (December"

1957), 266-78.

-

_.

9CCarter, 2,2- ~.

99Martba Cottle, wwttne8ses--Privilege·,-Communioation to Psychotherapists,
Universitl

2! Kansas !!!! Review

VI (May, 1956) I 597-~.

lOOJohn J. Cusack" "QuaU.f'l Your P87Chologut," The Insurance Couooil
Journal, XXVII (April, 1960), 329-.341.
.lOlJohn L. McCarl, "The Peycho1ogist in Court. tf 9hi!"!E Ke~
XXXIII (June, 1955), 230-240.

!:!! Review
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the article mentions the use ot the multi-volume works ot COz:EU! Juris,
SeC'Ullliwa. Words and Phrases and by now the familiar works

ot Wigmore. In

short, although the article presents marv' articles tor review, each ot these
articles as suggested by our colIR8nt on certain selections present the same
t)'pe ot approach aa the !Dulsell approach. At the present time only six
states recognize the confidential relatiouhips existing between psychologist
and c11ent. 102
U

In these states the relationahimJ is placed on the same level

the attornq-c11ent relationship.

Thia is seen in the lew York Statute:

'!'he contidential. relations and COIII1lUI11cationa between a
psychologist registered under provisions ot this act and his
client are placed on the same ba8is as those prori.ded by law
between attorney and client, and noth1ug in this article sball
be construed to requ1re &1V such privileged OOl'tI1'l\UUcations to
be disclosed.10)

Thus, the concept which is BOUght by the American Psychological A.sociation bas

not tully reached its objectives.
determined.
the lack

The reason tor this cannot be tully

One camsot place a point ot emphasis on one particular cauae tor

ot success

in the legal work bY' the APA.

This is somewhat under-

standable when one realizes that AMA baa not reached complete recognition in
all states.

Needles. to fJ&7 the pb,yaician has been functioning in society much

longer tbfm the Pl1Chologtst.

Several tactors have struck the writer 1n

l021he SU: states are Kentucky, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, Washington
and New York.
lOlDavld W. UNisell, -The Psychologist in Toda,.-s Legal World ....
Minnesota !!!! Re;;.; .;. .;.vi; ; .;e;.,;.;.w, XLI (Mq 1957), 735, cit1ug the New York statute.
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renewing the literature on the subject..
not3wortby cbaznpion

profession.

First, David W. touisell is the only

ot the cause ot legal rights ot the psychological

Secondly, other commentators in the journals present a general

re-bash of either Louisell eonausnts or a review of the material in Corss Juris
Secundum or some other encyclopedic source.

Thirdly, most ot the ccm:mentatora

upon analysis disagree in their approaeh to the problem
becomes vel',. orten conf'wled.

80

that the reader

Thia ,""iter h&a noticed man;r errors in

interpretation of the law and its implications.

mu-

In the article entitled

"Privileged Communication and the Clinioal Psychologist," the oomment was made

that it a law recognize. the profession ot p8fChologi8ta then, the state should
simply extend tbie privilege ot privilege oOlmllUuioatloM, without any regard

tor the complete developnent ot the concept of privileged communication .s
it bas

00_

to us through the centuries.1Ob. Moreover, the article declares

that it the privilage cannot be extended on the buis ot Mdical grounds then
it could be extended on the basis that in some areas medical assistant. have

been ,,1:Nn this right, so therefore, a peycbologist could be conceived as a
_c"iea.l ...!stant and therefore invoke this right.

ot Gutt.macber and Weinhoten'. book, Pseiatrl

A review of chapter twelve

!!!!! ~

~

investigation of the nature ot privileged communicationa.

heralded as the authority in the field.

presents a surface
Yet, the book is

To add to this problem., the role of

l04B. L. D1aroond and H. WGihofen, "Privileged COIIlllWlicat,ion and the

Clinical. PsycholOgist," Journal

2! Clinical

Psxpbolo gy IX (Octobar, 1953), 388.
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the psychologist bas not been defined under the law in those states which have
not statutes governing psychologists.

Moreover, one will tind no definition

ot psychologist, psyeootherapist or psychological counselor ex:tsting
accepted legal diot.ionaries suoh as '_,lo_r_d__
s

in the

!!E .;.,.;Pbr;,;;;;;.,;;,8S;;..,;e_s.

Some writers define psychotheraW in terms of the medical field; yet

legally, in

lnat'l)"

medical field.

aeeas and stat<-;s psyohotharapy is not within the

800pe

ot the

fl\dlw Define counseling in

Professor Trout in hie article

medical terms? fI points out that. in the state of

~fichigan

that the practice of

"psychotherapeutics constitutes the practice of medicine within the meaning of
the statute prohibiting the practice of medicine without a license. u105 Thus,

in the state of' Micbigan the practicing or psychotherapeutics falls w-ltllin
the realm. of' r;li3d1cinaj as such an iudividua1. should be lioensed by the state
he could be found guilty

ot practioing medicine without

III

license.

What then is needed and really' what the APA baa been suggesting is that
we need t.o define under the law the tollow1ng

psyeholol7,
if'

am

psychotherap,y.

Seoondly, we tTIW'It determine its relationship,

a:a;r, to the medical. field. Thirdly, we

state 1n licensillg tobe psychologist.

11'1U8t determiDe the role

Pourthly, we

of' privileged communications should be.
coming !'rom the jO\11"l.'1&l..

items. First, a definition of

IiIlSt

or

tb;;)

detmnine 14hat the rol

In this regard little has been fOl...th-

Most of the articles have simply re-empbasized some

of the caaes atteot1ng psychologists.

Amidst allot this perhaps the prof'e....

sion should more explicitly define their terms and their functions as they see
them.

Perhaps, no article olearl,y brings this forth to the reader as Combs

comments in his article I'?roblems and Definitions in lagislation. If Combs
i..'1.dicates that the important element of psyobotheraw is the relationship whi
is established bet1¥::'en

th~

client ani! the

thi~a:.oist.

Ri~

states that the

relationshi!) is :
l0500rdon M. Trout, r~Jhy Define Counseling in Medical Terms?n
and Guidanoo .Jou!"-:'l~.l :ruIr (~~:ay', 19Sh)" 520.
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defined dt:rterentl, by each school, but the emphasis he places is on the
general1.;y accepted taot tbat good therapists in all schools tend to be alike
in their functions.

He points out that

~hothat:'aPY'

is:

essentially' a tea.cb1ng relationship, or it oae preters it so, a
situation d3Signad to help a olient learn. Payohotherapy is, then
a learning situation in whioh a therapist seeka to help b1a olient
to explore and discover a better way ot l1te. Interestingl, enough,
this 18 exactly' what education attempts to do too. Education also
seeks through a relationship bet·ween teacher and student to usist
the pupil to find a better way of Ute. It 18 extremely- ditficult
to effectively' separate individual therapy from group therapY' of'
grou.p therapy tr01Il eduoation.l06

From th1a comment .. oan 1.m!red1atelY' see the d1ttioult1 which emerges when we
try' to determ1M what the function

ot payehother&py should be under the law.

Tben Combe oorrectly conoludes,
1'0 do this with the degree ot exactitude required tor inclusion in
a lioensing law see_ clearly impossible. Many psychologists reel
it is extreme17 important that the term ·psychotherapy' should be
written into any' licensing law, reeling that this would assure the
right ot the psychologist to do PQObotheraw. They feel that this
wou.ld assure the right ot the psychologist to do psychotherapy.
Tbe;r feel inclusion of Jl81Chothe1"apy .. a stated tunction ot a
ps;ychologiat and written into a licensing law would be public
aokDowledgment that pelObotberapy 18 a legitimate function of
payebolog,y and would at the same time torestall the attempts of
oerta1n other proteniona to establ1ab payohother&p7 .. an
exclus1:ve prerogative. 'l'bis seema like a wise move when it is
poSSible, but 1.IJ not really' essential in view of the ~aaibi11ty
of detining psychotherapy. The ditficult:¥" of writing a legally
lIOrkable def1.n1t1on of psychotherapy 1.IJ a great frustration, but it
18 also our best protection against the possibility of restricting
action by amther profes.ion.1OT

l06A• ~f. Com.bs, IfProblems and ne!'initiona in Legulation," Amrican
P!J'Choloa;!-8t VIII (Sept,ember, 19$3), p. 66.

-

l07Ibid.
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So we can euily env.t.slon the difficulty which is betore us when we try to

accompl.1ah our first goal which is si.rnply detining the position ot the
psychotherapist.

From this we can discern how difficult it :18 to determine

ita relationship to the nedical field espeoially if the P8)"'Cbologists' training
18 non-medical in orientation.

licena1n& board.

Moreover, we can grasp the difficulty ot the

Finally we lIOuld haft to determine . .t the role would be in

nprd to privileged oourrrunioations. Although the tirst three considerationa
have Inade litt.le progreu, the laat contention concerning the relationship of
the p81Chotherapist and the psycholog1ata and p£*irlleged commun:ication baa
fOWld iw way into litigation.

The leading cue is !.!l.t~

!.

!!.~.

The

court

declared that the admiaion of testiDlOI\Y of a men\al hospital physician and
pa;ychiatr1sts who had treated a defendant in a mental hoapital to which the

detendaAt had been committed until he was meatall.y competent to stand trial
... in violation ot the statute creating the privilege as to tacta learned by
a phyaic1an in treating a patient.

Alt~

th1s bas been termed the leadi.ng

case it should be noted that altbough the psychiatrist ma1nta1rDd his right to
the priY1lege, it cannot tullY' be construed to the realm

since the doctor held a M.D.

ot the P8)"'Chologist

What is important, however, is the commentary

made in the opinion:

In regard to mental. patients, the policy behind auch a statute is
part1cu.l.arly clear and strong. Many physical ailments might be
treated with some degree of etfeet1veneas by a doctor whom the
patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient' 8
confidence or he cannot help him. The psyohiatric patient
conf'idea more utterl,. than anyone else in the world. He exposes
to the therapist not onl7 what b1s words direetly eXJress, be la,..
bare his entire selt, his dre.... bis tantulea, hissw, and his
shame. Most patienta who urnergo psychotherapy lcnow that this 18
what will be expected ot them, and that the,. cannot get help except
on the condition ••• lt would be too mob to expect them to do so if
the,. knew that all the)" aay--and all that the psychiatrist learns

33
from wbat theY' atq--may be revealed to the whole world f'rom a
witness stand.1OO
Therefore, what re."llains is to place this thinking into effect on the level or
the psychologist.

Lou1sell suggests that this should 'be investigated on the

basis ot the f'amouaWigmore four conditions of privilege.

Yet, no commentary

has btten forthcoming in this 'Yein from the realm of' the P870bological journals.
However, an Article in the llJortbweatern University Law.Renew analyzes the
situation trom this point.

It is at tbe present time the moat detin1tiva

attempt to justity the right that l'870hologists should be extended the right ot
privileged communicationa. 109
Wigmore does not apply bis four critara to the p81'Chotherapiat patient
relationship.

Therefore, the article endeavors to apply thea. principles to

the ps;ycbotberap18t-patient relationship as it is currently envisioned.
Wigmore principles are in essence:
con1'idenoe?

(1)

'!'he

Doea the cotl1mun:i.cation originate in a

(2) Is the inviolabilitY' of' the confidence ntal to the achieve-

ment of the p1ll'1)Oses of the relationship?
should be foatered?

(3) Is this relationship one that

(4) Is the expected injury to the relation, through the

tear ot the later discourse greater than the expected beD8lit to justice in
obta1n1ng testimonYillO
Thus, after a rerlewor the hiStory ot the privilege, the author points

l08Texl or !_ ~.~. 2~. 398.
109Anonymou, "Confidential Communication to .A Psychotherapist: A New
Testimonial Privilege," tlortbwestern Univers1~ !!! Review XLVII (July-August,
1952), 384.
~\S TQW~
110w1.p1.Ore, ~. ill., p. 527.
~
~~
V
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out tbat Wigmore would not grant the privilege to the pbysician-patient relatio
ship, but be would grant it to the priest-penitant. relationship.

'l'beretore,

the 8Qtbor applies the tour principles to the psychotherapist-client relationShip thusly:
Since the verY' eseenoe or payobotherapy 18 a confidential personal
relationship about mattera which the patient is normally reluctant to
dieCUH, 8.lV' cotamication to a P87Chotherapist dur1ng the course ot a
collsultatioll are (1) mostly ot a confidential and secret nature, (2)
less likely and tar more dUticult to obtain it the patient knows that
they 1111.7 be revealed during the courae ot SOM future law suit, (3)
the outgrowth ot a relatioll8hip wh1ch should be tostered, (4) the t1J)e
ot information wb1ch it revealed would produce tar teW%' bemtita to
justice that consequent injury to the entire field ot psychotherapy.lll

'1'bu.8, we have the first anal.7s1B or application under lepl evidence ot what
the role ot the psychologist should be in the realm ot privileged communication. Yet, the author propans the problem that wbat 1otormation should be
held oont1dential needs to be clarit1ad. He also maintains that the terms
pe;,vobotherapist needa to be detined within the words ot the statute. He

f'urthe.r reels that this intnunity would rest only' with the proteasional
consultation in psychic or P8)"0botberapeutlc treatment.

'!'be author clearly

diatlJl1'l1shea the point ot counselin& in that be said privileged communicatlon
could be e:x:teMed to
been establ18hed.

8.

general practitioner it a counseling relationship bad

'1'bu.8, be admita that prlvileged oormamicatlon atl11 i. not

to be enended to the general practitioner and the counseling relationship by

its Yery nature should merit the right to privileged cOIImIlIlication on the same
basis u the attorney-client relationship.
The important quostion seems to be whether or not in litigation such a

111Anonymoua,

2E.

~.,

p.

~A8

;)V

•
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stand would be accepted. Although the court does not say that it needs the
above reasoning for distinguishing a need for privileged communication to a
psychologist over the medical field, there is a case in Illinois (a state whic
does not recognize the physician-patient relationship as confidential) which
accepts the fact that a clinical psychologist had a right to privileged
communication.

It should be noted, however, that the cue was heard in the

Circuit Court of Cook County, in Illinois. Thus, such a decision could be
appealed and possibly reversed by a higher court.

The important point is that

now some precedent has been established. And in the law the most important
thing is to have the door opened.

The door has been opened.

In Bender v.

Ruvell, an action for alienation of affection, the plaintiff sought to questio.
his wife's psychiatrist concerning information she had revealed during a serie
of psychiatric consultations.

The psychiatrist refused

to testify on the

grounds that any communications to him in the 80urce of psychotherapy were
confidential and could not be divulged without the patient's consent.

The

trial court upheld the claim of privilege and excused the psychiatrist from
test1f'y1.ng.ll2
Thus, in what appears to be the first decision of its kind without
statutory support, the court recognized what the psychiatrist had a right not
a8 an M.D., but as a psychotherapist to be granted the
communication.

r1~ht

of privileged

What mayor may not develop frODl this trial court ruling

cannot be determinedJ only time and future litigation can provide the answer.

112Bender v. Ruvell Civil Dockett 52C 2535 Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, June ~5, 1952 Judge Harry ?iseto, presiding.
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Our wbole purpose in this chapter bas been orientated around the notion of

what is the role of the guidance counselor and protessional imunity_

i-ie

initiated our remarks by stating that since most of the literature in the field
endeavored to draw a parallel between the psycho logiat and the gtlidance
CO\1nSelor, it 'behooved

WI

to examine what this role is.

We AW that only six

states recognized the right of privileged communication 'by' statute.

We have

'brietly' i.ndicated the need tor a more tborcnlgh &tuqy- on the part ot the psychological journals ot this role _ We htm3 tried to present some ot the
difticulties which tace the psychological profession in endeavoring to obtain
the right of professional immunity_ He have seen that the area of privilege
communication is perhaps the 'best develope<! legal area at this time.

Further-

more, we haw reviewed the basic guiding rules of evidence and we bave seen

that the psychotherapist oan be granted immunity on the basis of the rules ot
evidence_

Finally, we ba.'9'9 seen that it 1s possible bued on the rules of

evidence and not statutory law that the privilege could be granted.

However,

in the interests of the protossion, the role would best be defined if placel

under statutory law.
This, then, leads us to the essence of our investigation which is the
relationship ot the guidance counselor and protessional immunity.

The purpose

tor our rather lengthy history and development of privileged communication in
general is that to date no specific application has been made of this rule to
the guidance counselor.

Thus. whatever application will be made and what will

be inferred will have to be forthcoming from the rule as it has developed

during the last five hundred years.

To date, under statutory law, the

relationship of the guidance counselor to privileged communication

is!!!!..

The
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recognized relationship under common law is the attorney-client relation-

ship. Many inferences have been suggested in the Journals on the role of the
guidance caunaslor.

Most. of these comments

been said about psychologists.

have been inferred from what has

At the present time the guidance counselor does

not possess professional immunity under statutory law.

Moreover, he would be

oompelled to testitY in oourt or he would face contempt of court charges.
Therefore, our final task is to sift, from all a.vailable l'IlB.terials, just what
the role of the guidance counselor would be in relationship to professional
irl'm1wI1ty.

Our purpose here is to try and determine what implications can be inferred

for the guidance counselor in relationship to privileged communication.

Our

approach 1s somewhat unique in that rather than draw a comparison from the
psychological journals on this subject, we shall turn to the correct starting
point, namely':

the legal aspects baaed upon the code of evidence.

recognized authority in the field of evidence is Professor \'liigmore.

The

To the

best ot the writer's knowledge that this is the first time that the Wigmore
principles will be viewed in relationship to guidance-counselor--elient
relationship.

It is in this application of the Wigmore criteria to the role of

the guidance counselor that the ..iter hopes

't()

sbed some new light on the

problem of privileged communication and the guidanoe counselor.
We realize that the role of the guidance counselor is indeed unique.

The

school guidance cO'IlMelor's role as a reading of the professional journals will

indicate haa not yet been completely defined.

The journals are filled with

cO'flllmntary on surveys concerning what this role should be .113

Our purpose is

not to be involved with this quandryover the guidance counselor's role.
only have to accept the fact that

OM

of the functions

or

tie

the guidance

tllaordon Klopf, 'lEx,pand.i.ng Role of the High School Counselor," School
Society, LXXXVIII (November 5, 1960), 417-19.

J8
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counselor is counseling.

It is the counseling role that we shall oonsider.

For it is fairly obvious that the guidance role ot the guidance oounselor
vou.ld not involve a unique one to one relationship with a client which would be
person oentered.
Our contentions under granting the privilege to psychologists suggest four

contentions at investigation for rurther classUication of psychologists so
too the same contentions need olusification tor the guidance oounselor.

The

first step is to define the term oounseling.. Even Gilbert Wrenn indioates
that t.he distinction between psychotherapy and oounseling is batfling .114

Secondly, the reoognition of the profession under the law would be necessary.

Therefore, although the APGl Code ot Ethios stipulates counseling as a
profuSion, thU is not surticient in the legal world. llS

Thirdly, the

extension of such a privilep would preclude the right ot the state to license
the guidance counselor.

Thus, the area

ot state f'unctions in licensing

prooesses and standards would bave to be evaluated and undertaken.
Allot these area could indeed be subjeot. ot separate investigations of
an extremely exb.au&tift nature.

However, our purpose is to examine only'th;'

role of privileged communication as it relates to the guidance oounselor in his
role as a counselor.

Thus, for our purposes, we shall have to leave these

areas to othera for consideration and we shall have to asll'U.me that a clear

lUC• Gilbert 1r4-enn, "Statue and Role or the School Counselor, u American
Personnel!!!! .; ;,Ou;;.; i;,.; dan;.;o,; ;.; c;.; .e Journal XXXVI (November, 1957), 180.
115t'Ethlcal standards," PersODDtl am Qu.idance Journal XL (October, 1961),

206-9.

-

-
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answer will be forthcoming.
The first ot 'Wigmore Its criteria for the granting of the right of
privileged cottrmlnicati.on is that "the corr;;.nu.nication must originate in a confi-

dence that will not be disclosed.,,116 The ethics of the AP~ binds the
counselor to hold all sucb comzmmication as private and oonfidential and to

treat all Reb information in a proteHional manner. 111 Thws, the client as he
approaches the counselor in a CO'..meeling relationship is exhorted by too code

of ethics.

This statennnt alone might be sufficient to grant an affirmation to

Wigmore's tirst criterla.

ot

the oo."nmu.l'l1caUon"

Yet, it

beboo~s

us

tlO

further a:xa.rniM the nature

Fiedler'. studies indicated that of all schools of

tberaw the most characteristic point of an ideal relationship is that the
counselor is able "to participate complete in the patient's commt.mication.

118

It ia pDtral17 accepted that this communication reters to the construct of
the self .119 logars in trying to detennne how the counselor can create a
helping relationship pointe out that the first factor which t1'L1.18t be
communicated is trustworthinass. t20 If the dean of client-center therapy

accepts tbe idea that the first element is trustworthiness of the relationship,
then. the moat char'a.ctaristlc elemant. of the counselini relationship is

116wi.~re, 22- ~. 527.
1170000

or EthiCS, 2£. ill.

p. 207.

l18Fred E. Fiedler, ''The concept of an Ideal TherapeutiC Relationship,"
Joprnal 2! Clinical PS12holoU, XIV (August, 19'50), 240.

119carl R. H.ogers, Client-g~~tere(~ 'l'heraPl (riew York, 1951), p. 136.
t2~arl ~. aogers, "The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship,"
!!!! _Clui
........
dan
.........Cf3_ Journal XXXVII (September, 1958), 10.
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complete participation in the client comnrunication; it would seem that the
oommunication does originate in a confidence that will not be disclosed.

If

the individual is going to communicate the secrets of his self J it naturally

follows that a secret would

L~ply

a confidence which is not to be disclosed.

Thus, the communication in all probability is oonoeived as a confidential one
on the part of the client even if' he did not know of the APGA. Cude of Ethics.
Therefore, I believe we can safely conclude that the

conu~rumication

must

originate in a confidence that will not be disclosed ..
The second j,iigmore principle is that "this element of confidentiality must
be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenanoe of the relation between

the parties."

vIe have to a degree really ai'firmed this principle as being

fulfilled in the counseling relationship in our comment on the application of
the first principle.

However, let us elaborate upon this point.

The nature of

the relationship is desoribed by Curran:
Nor can one catoh in simple description the most subtle and complex
relationship that must exist between counselor and client, between
therapist and patient. Here the necessity of mutual inw 1vamant in
the human condition is most strikinely den~nstrated. The therapist
or counselor cannot stand apart in an objective u.nteeling, Cartesian
way. He must be a complete person, psychosomatically committed to a
deep, sensitive, and personal communion, a true giving ot self .121
Bearing these words in mind let us view this commentary:

12lcharles A. Curran, "Counseling, Psychotherapy, and the Unified Person,"
Journal ot Religion and Health II (January, 1963)109.
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"The greatest trust, t says lDrd Bacon, 'between men and men, is the
trust ot giving counsel. For in other confidences men commit the
parts ot lite; their landa, their goods, their ohildren, their
credit, someyraotical a.f'ta1r J but to such as the make their
oounsellors Lsic] they commit the whole, by how much the more they
are obligated to all taith and integrity.' The condition upon which
alone this counsel can be given requires particular attention •
•• • That the whole will not be told to counsel unless the privilege
is confidential is perfeotly olear. A man who seeks advice and
seeks it because he believes that he may do so safely, he will rarely
make disclosures Which may be used against htm •••• 122

Both quotations bear similarities as to the nature ot the counseling relationship.

The greatest gift is the gift

trust above all others.
century.

The seoond

ot seU' and it demands a confidenoe

and

'!'he first quotation by Curran is from the twentieth

~tation

is from the seventeenth oentury and was

employed in desoribing the deep process the client goes through in commnnicating to his attorney.

rt was employed in urging the application ot the

attorney-client privilege.

The writer felt it ironic that such an excellent

description of t.ha counseling relationship was dQacribed almo3t
,ears ago.

th.l.~ee

hundred

And when one stops to thini< of the role of the attorMY, he

pi."obably teels the l'leed of the clisnt to seek his cou.nsel.

tile attorlUY recaiveo. the title, counselor.

Perhaps this is why'

From this evidence, we can safely

contend that this element of confidentia.lity «lust be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the rela.tion between the parties.
trTbe relation must. be one which in the opinion

ot the oorr.mu.nity ought

to be

sedulously fostered, fI comprises the third rule as set forth by ~iigmore ••1123

122Wigmore, 2£. ~., p.

123~., p. 621.

541.

43
The two important words in this rule appear- to be "communitylf and ilsedulously.«
We m.ight ask ourselves ,just how the cOl1l11IlJ.nity has reacted to the ;:lewlopment of'
the counseling relatiotl8hip.

i;ie could answer by first citing the fact that the

Congress of the United States has responded favorably under Title V of' the
~ational

Defense Education Act by crea't.ing funds for the establishing of

Counseling Institu(,es

l01'

secondary

~chool

guidance counselors.

itlthough ea.ch

Institute i8 unique, the erapha.sis is upon counseling rather than upon guidancn.
Evident~

the community sees a need for fosterillg the counseling relationship.

The second fact which we cite is the growing number of school counselors

throughout the United States. 124

Indeed, the relation is one whioh the

community feels should be fostered.
The word "sedulously" implies the concept diligently pursued.

Can t1e not

infer from the extremely avid interest. of the comnmnity as represented by
school boards' desire to employ school counselors and the fact that the Congres
considers counseling part of defense 'I;,hat this relationship is considered to be
sedulously fostered?
This leaves us with the examination of the last principle.

"'file injury

that would insus to -"he rl:>lation bY' the disclosure of the communication must be
greater

tr~n

the benelit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."

He recognize the tact 'chat purpose of justice is to seek truth.
present f3d. us to use can be examined ontologically.

The question

The question presented for

our examination in this last principle is an age old one of ontological and

124.Jonel3,

2£. cit., p. 105.

t~lelogieal

concepts. More specif'ioally, is the preHrvation

the COWIImications more important than tohe ends or objectiws

ot the secrecy ot
ot society_

The

crux ot the situation resides in the degree to which we hold the sacredness of'
tbe client and the etfect that a violation of' this trust would have upon all
mch future relations both as to this client and the role

ot all future

relationa.
Profe880l" 'r.'iwnore in col'!lllenting upon the priest-penitent relationship,

atter chlrqing application of the privilege to the pb;y'sician-patient relationsb1p, states that (1) a perm.anent secrecy is essential. to any religious
conte.lonal system (2)

~

con.teasions wollld not be made if there was a

chance that they might later be diaclosed in a court of'

lawen

the prieat.~

penitent relationship should be fostered (4) to des'troy the oonfessional would
be to weaken the backbone

ot

m&n¥ religions while the gain would be Slight. l25

Although this paper has silently orltlciZl.ld the method
and comparisons, tM point

to be

or

drawing inferences

brought <Yilt is that Wigmore considers in the

prien-penitent relationship the effect upon the community if' we were to
dest.roy the confidence in the relationship.

inference by analogy but merely' to

Me

evidence considers it sufficient to

Thus, we do not m.ean to draw an

the tact that.Wiamore under the law

SLew

that by destroying the cont1<ient1a11.ne

of the relation we wuld destro)" the essence of the relat.ionship, and t.he
resulting destruction would cl.'"6ate bayoo in the oommunityls participation in t.
relationship, tr.t.en the rule of privilege should be extended, for in reality the

8
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community is benefiting as much as the ir..divi('lual even though complete justice

might not be acoomplished in a particular litigation.

Our analysis ot the tirat three rules points out the necessity of
oonfidentiality to the relationship.

As a matter at fact the relationship

probably wou.ld not exist 1£ this element of trust did not enter into it.

If' tb

oOlllJlWlity fee18 that counseling is 8saential. then it would be sate to assume
that the oannunioations at a olient should be held oonfidentialJ otherwise,

olients will not enter into the counseling relationship. Thus, it wou.ld appear
that it vou.ld be tar better that justioe might not be serwd in order to

protect the general coatidence which the eonmamltT as entru.eted to eounaeling.
Tbis 18 the same confidence with which IDrd Bacon cited in the seventeenth
centur,y.

The same confidence which merited the attorney-client relationship.

With these thoughts 1n mind, we can aately conclude ttat the fourth principle

can be fulfilled in a counseling relationship.

Such would be well and good, if

our irl'nst:Lgatlon. had not v1.ewed this commsnt by Warren T. Powell, Hall
confidential information expressed in an interview should be held sacred.

It

should be used on17 with permission ot the counselee unless the welfare ot the

oomrounity or school is jeopardized••• tf Here we tind that Powell believes that
tbe contideuce should be broken.

If we admit this concept, then we no longer

oan fulfill the tourth contention ot \dgLOOre and we must fulfill all f'ou.r in
order to merit the cloak

ot privilege communication. We cannot determine in

what sense Powell make. this COI'!U:Ilent, perhaps, he advocates this concept so as

to warn guidance counselor. about their obligations to sooiety especially since
they do not have the cloak of privilege oommtlnication.

make. no such distinction.

The APGA Code, we note,

Perhaps, this 1939 citation has nov been overruled
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bY' the APGA Code.
Let

WI

stop tor a moment and look at the counselor's role if' it were

accorded privileged comnunication.

First, the priest in a. confessional who

hears a confession of criminal guilt, cannot 00 cannon law report this crime to
the proper authorit:le8.

In those areas ot statutory recognition of the

pr:lY1lege, he ie eXBmpt from teet:lfying in court ot this tact.

Secondly, it

aeema eYident that if' we make one exception, we are putting a hole in the dike

ot protection. Thus, this point daterm:lnes the attention ot the counselor.
From our analya1s it appears that the counselor is going to have to give the
client full trust in all matters in order to merit proteuional immunity.
On the other band it might be possible though probably not desirable tor

the cOWlSeling re lationah1p to make exceptions ot the content ot certain
COI'IIIlUn1cationa •
At the present time the guidance counselor is uot covered by the pri'rilege

ot protessional i.nmtu.nity. Theretore, the counselor should

be aware

or

this and

the client should be made aware of this fact unless the counselor decides to

accept the possibility ot facing a contempt. of court charge.

Thus, in contl"ut-

iug our inwstigation with the comments or the article by Carter, ve can agree

with him. that guidance counseling does not coma within the scope of activities
to which professional inmunity baa been granted.

that counseling qualifies

&8

a profes8ion.

Carter rightfully maintains

We &gI:"&e but add that such a

def'inition should be tortboOJJ1ng from the court. or established by definition
under statutory law.

We can agree that counseling is suftering from a lack ot

such acceptance as gz:oanted to other protessiona.

W$

agree with him that the

counselor is ethically bound to his professional philosophy to consider the
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clients cournu.n1cat1on as contidential, but we believe that investigation cannot
agree with his conwent that the client is bound by the legal statutes of all
the stat.es since statutory law does not exist on thi.a point.

\\ie further agree

that oounselors should know their role under the cloak ot privilege

communication, howe1'9r, we did not endeavor to investigate the area ot libel
and slander.

We oan agree with his contention that iromnity should be g1:ven to
HolM't"e1", we cannot agree with his oomment that he believes that

the COUDaelor.

i t a cue presents itself the

prinleged communication.

guidanc,~

counselor will receive the right ot

We think that our considerations which have not been

preT10uely presented indicate that tr.e courts might be reluctant to extend this

privilege.

We state this tact looking back on the tive hundred years that

were needed to develop the attorney-client relationshiPJ we look to the fact

that the physician-patient relatiol18bi.p is not fully reoognized under

statutory law nor is the priest-penitent relationship fully recognized.

We

realize that throughout the ages the three professions wore law, medicine and
It the law bas been alow to recognize the rights

the Clmrch.

ot these

profeu1ona I then we can somewhat envision bow slowly they might act in other
protessiona.

The best example is seen in the drive of the American PsycholOgi-

cal A.ssociation.

They only have the right

ot privileged communication under

statutory law in six states. Yet, we cannot fOl'get the trial court decision in
nlinoie.

It is indeed possible that it could act as a catalytical agent and

stimulate the extension of the privilege to the guidance counselor.
might be alluding to this concept.
if/a must also bear in

Carter

In this senae, we could concur wi't#h him.

mind the cor.1Mnt cited early by CorP!:!!

~

Secundum that

the tendency "is not to extend the classes to which the privilege trom
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disolosure is grantoo, but to restrict the privilege.l26

The further implications far guidance oounselors is that it is possible
to 8rpe under the rules of evidence for the extension of the rule of
privileged communications tor guidance counselors.

It is also assumed that the

counselor will be aware that if the privileged :La accorded to him that the
privilege ex1ata for the cUent and not for the counselor.

commentaries made under the discu88ion for the development
would be applicable to the counselor.

Also all of the

or

the privilege

Fo,-" example, it i8 assumed that if' the

cOl'lll'llm1.cation is overheard by a third party the third party could testify.

Moreover, it is urged that under further impU.catiOl18 for guidance counselors,
that Q)D8icieration should be given by the profsHion and the courts in defining

oounseling and the cowuseling profe88ion a.long with det1n1ng the role or
licensing the profession.

These three factors plq a very important role in

the future implications for guidance counselors in the privileged conununication

area.

12~ores Juris Secundum, 2.2. ~., p. 741.

CHA1'TER VI
SUMYIARY AND CONCLUSIONS

At the onset of this paper we set our goal as two-told--tirBt to eX&"nine
the historical significance and develoJXllent of the privilege and secondly to
apply this knowledge t.o the role ot the guidance counselor and protessional
1mmun1t7.

Our investigation pointed out that the origin

or

the privilege was

rooted in the Elizabethian period where the privilege originally stemmed from.

the honor ot the gentleman. As time progressed the courts sought to seek
justice and '5<dshed to destroy- the privilege. But a new theory bued on the

Mad ot the cUent tor the privilege arosa. 'l'he new theory envisioned the
needs ot the client to be

two
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great as to seal the lips ot the attorney.

I1X)vements grew side by .ide until we see the emergence

know it today.

l:fe

ot the rule

These
as

we

see that the privilege was not aocorded to the mdioal

prote.aion except under statutory law in the United States and then with
various limitations, applications and signi.ticances. We baTe seen that the
lips ot the physician are sealed only in the oourtroom..

ot the

CO\U"troom is governed only by hia ethios.

""''hat he aays outside

Our concern also bas been

with the guidance counselor's role in litigation.
We then v'l. }wed the davelopnent of privileged communication through the
dec1aions and opinions of the court.

We noted that the law cannot compel a

person to testify once the privilege has been accorded tC' him.

The rule

applies only to that which is privileged and therefore the rule is conditional
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;;0
not absolute.
ble 'knowledge.

A person must testli"y to that whiah is aither

c~n

or

Ob$0r~"a

Unless there is an 9xpl'essed statute no privilege exists..

interpretation of 'the statute rasts upon the opinion of the courts.

The

Noreover,

the privilege only applies to those relationships recognized under the law

even i f two individuals feel that their relationship is confidential, it i8 not
aooorded the priri.lega without statutory recognition.

U a third party

bears the conversation t.he third party may testify to what he hears.

O't'el"-

The

important fact is that the privilege doea not terminate with the termination

ot the relation--,hip. We haw seen

that the state of Il11nois recognizee no

privilege exoe?t that of attorney-client.. Finl.lly, we reaUze that the
privilege under existing law does not apply to the gu1dance oounselor.

We have then viewed the relationsbip ot the gtlidance counselor and professional imn:mity.

In order to more tully 'Ul'lderstand tb1a role, we reviewed

the work of tb3 APA in endeavoring to obtain immunity tor psychologists.

most ot the lttal"ature has been applied to the OO't.UUJeling field, we saw

to exatn1ne the material.

Our investigation pointed out

research and clarification in the field.

II

of state licenaing must be clearly defined.

Secondly... there exists a naed to
Thirdly', the role

Finally... the role ot the

psychologist and privileged communication needs to be olarified.

ot psychology bas been oaptured

!!.§..

need

need tor additional

derine the relationshJ..p ot psychology to the mdical field.

reviewed the leading Que, T&lo!, !.

II

}J'e concluded that there was a need to

define the term, "psychology" under the law.

the problem in the field

Since

by Combs.

'l'bs crwt of

'fIe, then

on the relation of tM PQVb.1atrist

and the oommunication between him and his patient.

\Ie, then, reviewed the role

of the peyohologist in view of the famous '\<!1gmore principles.

OUr investigatio
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indicat.ed that psychologists should oome under the scope ot privileged ooIlmWlication aucb as six states have already conferred the privilege.

A tria.l court

in Illinois baa set a small but very important precedent when it recognized the

right of a psyoh1atr18t to be entitled to privileged oommunication on the basis

ot his psychological

background rather than upon his m.edical degree.

Our final

commentary wu that under C01M¥)n lall and existing statutory law, no privilep
can be applied to guidance COUtUJOlors.
Th1s commentary brought us to the fact that ,. should endeavor to define

the role

ot the guidance oouuelor in relation to privileged communications.

The geuaral purpose

ot this paper wu to anal.7Ze this role not

by the

comparl.80n method aa bu previowtly been endeavored, but to develop the role
on the W1gmol"e conditions.
the rules

tve have endeavored to dellDDStrate that based upon

ot evidenoe the guidance oounselor should

OOllIIII1I11cation.

be granted privileged

tile found, 11owe'9'9r, that in order to merit thiB recognition

under the law the oounselor 'WOUld have to admit to the tact that all informatio
must be kept confidential eYeD if it would jeopardize the C01llllmity.

It the

counselor did not do this, be vould weaken hie chances tor reoeiving the oloak
of protection.

Howewr t it baa been suggested that under statutory law the

legislature could relieve eounaelor anxiety by

exclu~

certain types ot

information. We alao saw that the priv11ege as extended would carry with it al'
the 11m1tations and olarifications whioh have developed throughout the past

tiw

hundred

years.

\'16 haw

sean that the guidance counselor today does not rall under the

real.r.t of privileged oOl1'lnUllications.

The chance that immunity 'WOuld be granted

1s rather doubtfUl since the oourts have no desire to extend the privilege.
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However. we have pointed out that under the rules of evidence there exiats no
legal obstacle far its application.
~

ra.ay J thus, oonclude that the history and the deve lop;'.ent of the rule of

privileged comtllUnications has indeed been long.

\le oan conclude that under the

current Amorican jurisprudence the right of privileged cotTlMWlioation does not
apply to the guidance c0'U.'Il881or.

application of the

~~igm.ore

~"e

have concluded that under our analysis and

rules ot evidence tbat such an immunit-,f could be

vanted. he finally ooncluded that in order tor the oourta to realize a need
tor eatablisbing such an extension and tor legislatures to enact suoh legislation the profession and the protessional association should endeavor to assist
and promote the cause as meb as pos.ible especially by paving the way in the

areas ot establishing a definition of counseling, Clarifying the role of the
counseling profession and defining the role of the state in licensing the
profes.ion.

\,Jhile our investigatiDn bas indicated that (1) the relationship of

-

Ja'ivilege COJlDW1ioation to the guidance counselor is nil (2) auch a privilege
oould, as irnicated in our investigation by applying the 1Niamore rules tor the
first time to the guidanae oouwselor--client relationship. and (J) should be

extended to the guidance COUJ.1Bslor-cl1ent relationship, (4) oertain preliminary
steps as il'Idi.cated would be helpful in initiating and continuiQg the drive for

ext,ending this privilege to guidance oounselors

wno

~tion

as oounselors.

BIBUOG.1APH!

Arkansas :te-oorts..
State of Arkansas, to date.
t

~asl~~

Rap;>rts, ~-186S.

Qrae and Sons. Edinburg, 1930.

English Renorts Annotated, 1866 to Present.

The PJ3ports and Digest Syn.l'tcate,

Ltd. , :tOii.aOn, 19Ui to aiii _t

Federal Rel?2rts..
~al

\iest Publishing COl'i'Ip8n1'.

S!PElement. West Publishing

Northeast Rewrts_

lrooklyn, New York, to date_

C~.

Brooklyn, tlew York, to date.

"least Publishing C01'llp&l\V, Brooklyn, New York,

to date.

Northwest Reports. 'v.-at Publishing Company, Brooklyn, New York, to date.
~

Repgrts.

state of 0h10, to date.

Pac1fic Remts. west Publishing Company, Brooklyn, New York, to date.
Southwest JUtports.

Hest Publishing Compe.ny', Brooklyn, New York, to date.

s!p!"eme Court Reports.
United

S~

RSE?rts.

~,ri8Consin ~2?r~!,-

Government Printing Oftice, \'!Uhington, to date.
Ooverment Printing Office $ "'lashington, to date.

Hest Publishing Company, st. Paul, to date.
II.

SE':CONDARY SOURCES
A.

BOOKS

Bentham, JererrT3'_

!!!!. ~1m1t. !?! Jur'1!l!:t!dence.

De Witt, Clinton.
Springf'1e1d,

l~!.

New York:

1951.

?riY11eEd Communication OOtween P!y:sician and Patient.
_...
...
-

w.des, Francia and Harold J. Gilbert, ads. Cows Juris Secundu."1t XCVII.
York:

1957

53

New

54
9~ling:

l'.cOowan, John F., and lq1e D. Sohmidt.
Practice. New York: 1962.
Rogers, Cvl R.

Clie~-Center2d

E_V'id;.,.;;·
_9_nee;.;,;;.;;;.

\lignnre, John H.

i:!!

1'b.erapz. New

'l'r1a~s

B.

?eadings in Theorl
1951.

Yorks

!! COmlllOn!!!,

!!E

VIII.

Boston:

1961.

P'iRIODICAIB

"A Suggested Priv1.1ege for Cont'ident.1al CoJ!tl'.Ul1ications with Marriage Counselors
Uniwrait'2! ?ef!l!llvania .!!! Review. cn (December, 1957), 266-78.
Carter, Thomas M.

-

"Professional Immunity for Guidance Counselors. 1t

Personnel

and Gu:1dance
Journal XXXIII (November, 1954), 13-3$.
;....;,;,;---

.......

Combs, Allie :r. "Problems and Def'1:nitions in Legislation. n Amerioan ?!1Oholoi
1st VIII (Sept.ember, 19.)3), 554-563.

-

JlCont1dent1.al Cottmllnicat1ons to a Psychotherapist: A New Testi.monial
Privilege. It Hort.hweswn University Law Review SLVI! (July-August, 19'52),

384-9.

'

_.

Cottle, Martha. ,,\-iitnesses--Prlv11ege-Cotamication to P8)'Cootherap1sts, tI
Univarsitl ~ Kanau !:!! Review VI (May, 1956), 587-99.
Curran, Charles A.

Journal

"Counseling, Psychotherapy, and the Unified Person. n

2! Religion

~ Healt~ II (Januat'Y,

Cuaaok, John J. "Quality Your Ps.ychologlst."
XXVII (April, 1960), 329-341.
Diamond, Bernard L. and Henry Weihoten.

Cl1n:1oal Psychologist .. "
1$'53), )80-90.
"Ethical Standards."
~.

Journal

1963), 95-111.

The Insurance Council Journal,

-

, ,

-

..•

"Privileged CoDlllll11ication and the

ot Clinical Psychologist IX (October,
-

--

Personnel and {}.tidance Journal XL (October, 1961) ,:06~~

Fiedler, Fred E. ''The Concept of an Ideal Therapeutic Relationship." Journal
2! Clinical PSl!?boloQ' XIV (August, 1950), 239-245.
.
Jonas, Arthur J. and Leonard N. ~Uller. "The ~lational P1ct"...l.l:.'u of Pupil
Personnel and (}.tidanee Services in 195). n The Bulletin of the National
Association of Sec~ SChool fTincil?,!ls. y.xxftn (re~, t§;li) ,

Id;-159.

---

t .

. ...

tnJ:xpanding rolc ot the high school counselor .. II 5chool and
Sooiety UX:mII (November 5, 1960), 411-9.
.. -

Klopf, Gordon.

If

!Dulsel1, :;)avid
l\ev1ew

~;.

I1Tr..e Ps;rcholoeiot in Today1a Logal \Jo:-1d. 1i

11innet??~!e!

XLI (Hay, 1%7), 731-50.

L~ . . "'l'be I'sycbologist in Couz"t.tI
(June, 19?5), 230-240.

I'ioCary, John

Ct..ic!R0-~ ~

;?..evio}J XX.XIII

,1.

a."ld Richard J. Simpson, "Some legal Implications of the Client
Counselor Helatlonship--A H.ev1ew of the Literature." Counselor Education

Miller, Frank

Supervision I (Fall, 1961), 19-29.
Radin, :flax.
Client. It

liThe Privilege of Confidential Comntmications Between Lawyer and
Calit~rnia ~ Review XV! (September, 1928), 487-8.

Roger", Carl R.

"The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship.ff

!!!! ~i~ .-Journa.;.;;;;;;;..;;;;;;;.;;;.l

Trout, David U.

Ou.1dan!.t:

-

XXl'VII (September, 1958), 6-16.

"Why' refine Counselini in Medical Terms?"
~?UI"nal XXXII (fi';ay, 1954), 518-523.

Peraonnel
,
...

Personnel and
-

APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Patricia Bernice Kubistal
has been read and approved by three members of the
Department of Education.
The final copies have been examined by the director
of the thesis and the signature which appears below
verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been
incorporated, and that the thesis 1s now given f1nal approval
with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.
The thesis 1s therefore accepted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Date

